The 42nd Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) Summit and Related Meetings in Indonesia remain the most critical crossroads for the immediate, and long-term relevance and fate of Asean’s role in the region and beyond.
It exposes the most consequential crossroads, with the lingering Myanmar debacle that bears witness to the futility of Asean’s approach, unchecked tensions in the South China Sea, futile efforts for conflict prevention mechanisms, growing autocratic trends and disregard for human rights, and other structural economic and geopolitical challenges, further eroding Asean’s relevance and exposing its deep-lying systemic weaknesses.
Asean was born out of a common fear of communism and external threats, and it remains the same for now. However, the capacity to stand up to external threats from a collective joint deterrence and capacity point of view remains lost.
Indonesia will want to be seen as the ever-strong Asean leader and will want to take the lead in solving the Myanmar issue and in providing a clear platform and guidelines for South China Sea stability through the fast-tracked Code of Conduct (CoC) and a flurry of backdoor diplomacy for Myanmar.
It is in a race against time and is under pressure to be seen as the most important regional and Asean leader, fresh from its G20 and global diplomatic success, and would want to set the right tone before handing over to Laos, knowing full well that by then, the momentum might drop due to an entrenched affiliation with Beijing, and the potential pressures applied, as had happened previously.
The Myanmar crisis and the growing tensions in the South China Sea are just two of the main indicators highlighting the failed approach of Asean in being limited by its inability to exert credible and solid measures. Jakarta realises this, and so do other member states. However, decades of stable status quo benefit derivation have created a common reluctance for significant shifts that would alter regime and regional security.
Historical regional cohesiveness in the region is primarily tied to trade and economic relativity and a common yearning for security assurances.
The region is primarily shaped by economic and security importance, and openings for value-based and normative moral high ground for strong value-driven developmental essence are inadequate, unlike in the European Union. The region remains trapped by its own ignorance and Utopian belief of its decades-old ‘Asean Way’ approach and de-escalation of conflict through idealistic dependence on a non-confrontational approach and conflict prevention mechanisms through its different tiers and channels of dialogues.
Fears and wariness of China’s ambitions for the region, the quest to deny the West’s containment foothold in the region, the agenda in the South China Sea, and the fallout of a full-blown Taiwan conflict, all create the perfect storm for both a declining impact of dialogue and the efficacy of confidence-building measures.
The West sees Asean as a lost cause in standing up against China and containment measures, while China wants Asean to remain in its status quo of neutrality, which means a freer option for China to expand its grip and reign, and denial of space for the West.
Asean has yearned for stability and status quo, in fear of a repeat of the Cold War divide and has created a flurry of mechanisms from the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) to the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) and SEANWFZ, among others. However, it has been futile and toothless in getting the required stability in the SCS with an ineffective response to Beijing’s coercive tactics.
The desired stability and peace have failed to materialise and the efforts have been threatened by the growing security dilemma and eventual arms race in the scramble for survival.
It cannot shed the trap of its founding principles, and cannot afford to intimidate Beijing, while at the same time, cannot solicit greater Western assurances, either. It remains trapped in its own worst game.
Asean has no capacity in hard or soft power to push for greater deterrence in order to secure its aim of stability in the region, and will need external involvement and support. Ironically, this will also break its own yearning for neutrality.
Years of Asean and regional strategic ambiguity have only yielded three results. Firstly, it gives Asean the weakest returns and makes it even weaker with its trapped dogma and inability to provide credible solutions, apart from the futile preventive mechanisms and confidence-building measures.
Secondly, it denies the full space needed for the West to galvanise collective regional cohesion and unity in creating a more able and credible shield and deterrent effectiveness.
Thirdly, it gives Beijing the biggest space and green light to further deepen its hard power postures and build on the increasing pie of influence and dominance in the South China Sea and the region. The divide is apparent and growing as a result, in the continental state grip (Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia) and the archipelago states (Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines).
The region and Asean bask in the false sense of security from its avoidance of the hard truth and in refraining from directly challenging the risks in the region, while hoping for a tacit Western counterbalancing act, especially in direct economic and trade support. While the region has no qualms in being quick to embrace RCEP, the BRI and direct economic overtures from Beijing, it faces a reluctant move to quickly embrace the Indo Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF).
The IPEF is no match for its Chinese counterparts in terms of capital and trade capacity, and it does come with the moral high ground values of labour standards, climate initiatives, normative democratic adherence, and human rights. All these are as unappealing to the region as a carrot to a lion.
The same goes for the CoC, the same opening exploited by Beijing to portray its diplomatic clout and to buy support, but knowing full well that it still can dictate the same moves, should they be warranted.
Declining deterrence impact will only worsen the depth of the arms race, and further weaken the region’s collective resolve. There is only so much the returns from Track I and II diplomacy can do, if policymakers are reluctant to initiate bold changes to the set-up.
Hypocrisy and self-trap are laid bare, from the chastising of Washington for doing so little for Asean financially and economically but continuing to yearn for its defensive support, to pushing for deeper Washington trade commitment but boasting of its strict neutrality approach.
Asean needs external capacity to effectively enforce binding agreements in the future CoC or to keep UNCLOS adherence, but cannot afford to directly solicit this hard power deterrence and maintain Asean’s concept.
AUKUS, a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, actually serves as the most effective deterrent, and Asean knows it will help, but cannot welcome it due to its self-limitation.
Direct bilateral defence engagement, overtures, and agreements with the West as can be seen now in the Philippines and increasingly others, are meant to secure individual states but will also give the region a much-needed assurance and credible hard power deterrence.
Asean needs to change its principles and be bold in calling out law-defying behaviours by external parties, especially China, to ensure that it walks the talk of maintaining regional stability. Failure to address the current systemic shortcomings will see it fade into irrelevance.
For it to be relevant in the future, changes in its orientations and non-interference stand are a must. It will have to adopt a more EU-like common policy on defence and re-enact movements of the old Seato concept with the help of the West with a regional Nato-like framework. This remains the realistic and needed framework in dealing with both Beijing’s increasing bellicosity and continuous strategy in the region, and in ensuring Asean’s strength and relevance.
Collins Chong is a foreign affairs and strategy analyst at Universiti Malaya. This is the personal opinion of the writer and does not necessarily represent the views of Twentytwo13.