There is a peculiar contradiction in Malaysia’s political landscape over the definition of government and opposition.
Before the Johor and Negeri Sembilan state elections, the arrangement was relatively straightforward. At both the federal and state levels, Pakatan Harapan (PH) and Barisan Nasional (BN) governed together while Perikatan Nasional (PN) sat in opposition.
That political equation changed when BN chose to contest all 56 Johor state seats against PH despite both parties being partners in the federal unity government.
The split widened when Pas announced support for all Muslim candidates regardless of party affiliation, a move that primarily benefited BN candidates, including those from MCA and MIC, under the banner of Malay-Muslim unity.
The support appeared far from spontaneous. Reports of meetings between BN and Pas suggested an emerging understanding that ran counter to BN’s existing partnership with PH.
BN attempted to downplay the development, describing it as an initiative by grassroots members. However, the election outcome told a different story. BN secured a commanding majority with Pas’ backing, leaving PH with just eight seats.
In Negeri Sembilan, the BN-PN cooperation became even more explicit through a publicly announced seat arrangement, with BN contesting 23 seats and PN nine – effectively pitting BN against its federal coalition partner.
The alliance delivered victory for BN and PN, which won 26 seats, while PH secured only 11, including nine by DAP and two by PKR.
From PH’s perspective, this represented a breach of the trust and political understanding underpinning the unity government.
Despite this, Umno president Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi maintained that developments at the state level would not affect BN’s commitment to the federal government.
Datuk Seri Azalina Othman Said, the de facto law minister and Umno information chief, defended the arrangement by arguing that political dynamics differ between the federal and state levels, making it possible to be both ally and opponent simultaneously.
This raises an obvious question. How can BN support the policies of the federal government while aligning itself with the opposition in state elections?
The contradiction is difficult to reconcile. A coalition partner cannot realistically function as both government and opposition at the same time.
If BN wishes to preserve its political credibility, it should clearly decide where its loyalties lie.
Its recent cooperation with PN, particularly Pas, suggests a relationship that could eventually evolve into a broader electoral pact against PH.
Having benefited from Pas’ support in Johor and formalised cooperation in Negeri Sembilan, BN may find it increasingly difficult to distance itself from PN.
Yet it continues to insist that its federal partnership with PH remains intact.
One possible explanation is political expediency. Remaining in the federal government provides access to ministerial positions, government machinery and influence, while cooperation with PN may strengthen BN’s electoral prospects among Malay voters.
Looking ahead to the 16th General Election, BN and PN could well formalise their cooperation against PH and Bersatu.
Whether Pas would be prepared to allocate BN a meaningful number of seats in Pas-controlled states such as Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis remains an open question.
For now, however, the two parties appear united by their shared opposition to PH.
Ultimately, Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim must decide whether the unity government can continue to accommodate what the writer views as irreconcilable political contradictions before they undermine the coalition from within.
