The reported declassification of the Federal Territories Pardons Board minutes concerning former prime minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak’s proposed house detention raises important constitutional questions extending beyond whether one supports or opposes him.
The controversy concerns our constitutional monarchy, the exercise of royal powers, the rule of law and the relationship between law and politics.
According to reports, the Attorney-General objected to the proposed house detention during the Pardons Board meeting on Sept 18, principally because there was no existing legal framework for such an arrangement.
He reportedly also raised concerns about its political and economic implications. The Federal Territories Minister reportedly expressed objections as well. Nevertheless, the proposal received royal approval.
These developments invite an examination of the significance of constitutional advice and the role of the courts in determining the limits of public power.
The constitutional monarchy
Malaysia is a constitutional monarchy in which the powers of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong derive from the Federal Constitution. Article 42 confers the power to grant pardons, reprieves and respites, and to remit, suspend or commute sentences.
The question is whether the constitutional power to pardon or commute a sentence extends to directing that imprisonment be served at a private residence, and how such a direction relates to the existing statutory powers of the prison authorities, particularly the power to release prisoners on licence under Section 43 of the Prisons Act 1995.
Examining this issue should not be regarded as challenging the monarchy. Understanding the constitutional limits of royal powers is essential to maintaining respect for the institution and public confidence in its decisions.
The Attorney-General’s objections
Under Article 42(9), the Pardons Board must consider the Attorney-General’s written opinion before tendering its advice. However, the Constitution does not expressly require the Board to accept that opinion.
The Attorney-General’s views are important, particularly concerning the legal basis for a proposed decision, but his opinion is not a judicial determination. Consequently, proceeding despite his objections does not, by itself, render the decision unconstitutional. Equally, royal approval does not necessarily resolve every question concerning the legal scope of the power exercised.
Royal discretion and constitutional advice
Article 40 generally requires the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to act on advice, subject to constitutional exceptions, while Article 42 establishes a specific process involving the Pardons Board.
The constitutional significance of the Board’s advice and the extent to which the sovereign is bound by it warrant careful examination. These questions cannot be resolved merely by invoking “royal prerogative” without considering the relevant constitutional provisions and judicial authorities. Even discretionary powers must be understood within the constitutional framework that confers and regulates them.
The courts and constitutional limits
Malaysian courts have traditionally been reluctant to review the merits of decisions under Article 42. Cases such as Sim Kie Chon v Superintendent of Pudu Prison and Juraimi Husin v Pardons Board, State of Pahang reflect this approach.
However, I believe an important distinction must be maintained between challenging the merits of a pardon and questioning whether a particular decision falls within the constitutional authority to grant clemency.
The former concerns whether a prisoner deserves mercy or whether a sentence should be reduced – matters traditionally regarded as falling within the constitutional pardoning process. The latter concerns the legal boundaries of the power itself. Whether Article 42 authorises a particular form of detention is fundamentally different from asking whether the person concerned deserves clemency.
In my view, the doctrine of non-justiciability should not automatically prevent the courts from examining whether Article 42 provides a lawful basis for house detention. Such examination would not involve questioning the wisdom of royal clemency, but determining whether the power exercised falls within constitutional limits.
Interpreting non-justiciability so broadly that questions concerning constitutional authority become insulated from judicial examination would raise concerns about constitutional supremacy and the judiciary’s responsibility to interpret the Constitution.
The Bar Council’s legal challenge may provide an opportunity for judicial clarification, subject to the preliminary requirements governing judicial review. A reasoned determination would contribute to Malaysian constitutional law and guide future exercises of the pardoning power.
When law and politics intersect
The reported objections included concerns not only about legality but also about possible political and economic consequences. Such considerations are understandable in public administration.
However, political desirability and constitutional legality are not necessarily the same. A decision does not become unconstitutional merely because it is politically unpopular, just as political expediency cannot confer legality upon an action the Constitution does not authorise.
For decades, I have been urging Malaysians to reflect on our tendency to allow political considerations to override more fundamental concerns of law, justice and good governance. Political expediency may serve immediate interests, but the long-term consequences of such compromises can weaken our institutions and undermine public confidence in them.
Our approach to constitutional interpretation should not depend upon whether we support or oppose the individual concerned. Otherwise, political preferences risk influencing the very principles intended to govern public power.
An opportunity for constitutional clarity
The Najib controversy should not become a confrontation between the monarchy, government and judiciary. Each institution has constitutional responsibilities, and their proper discharge should strengthen our constitutional system.
If the legal framework concerning house detention is inadequate or uncertain, legislative or constitutional clarification should be considered.
Constitutional justice extends to everyone, including those convicted of serious offences. Najib, like any other individual, is entitled to have his legal rights and constitutional position determined fairly and according to law.
Ultimately, the enduring significance of this controversy should lie in the opportunity it presents to clarify our constitutional law, strengthen public confidence in our institutions and ensure that justice is done, including to Najib himself.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent those of Twentytwo13.