Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping how information is generated, disseminated and consumed. Information was once treated as a supporting instrument of national power, used to communicate policies, shape narratives, and support diplomatic, military or economic efforts. That assumption no longer holds.
In today’s digital environment, information has become a central arena of strategic competition. The ability to shape how people think, maintain trust and influence responses is now critical to national resilience.
This does not diminish the importance of military or economic strength. These remain core instruments of national power. However, their effectiveness is increasingly shaped by the information environment in which policies are debated and public responses formed. A state may possess strong institutions, a resilient economy and capable security forces, yet still be weakened if public trust erodes, official information is challenged, or citizens become vulnerable to hostile information campaigns.
Artificial intelligence has intensified this challenge. AI systems can rapidly generate, analyse and disseminate text, images, audio and video at scale. They can identify target audiences, track sentiment and tailor messages to evoke emotional responses and shape perceptions. Information campaigns can now be conducted with greater speed, scale and precision than ever before.
Unlike earlier influence operations, which often relied on broad propaganda aimed at mass audiences, today’s campaigns are targeted, adaptive and persistent. This has altered the nature of information competition. Hostile campaigns and disinformation efforts are no longer limited to isolated falsehoods or one-off attempts to mislead. They operate continuously across multiple digital platforms.
Actors can observe audience responses, refine messages and rapidly deploy revised narratives to deepen emotional impact. Narratives that gain traction are amplified, while those that fail are adjusted or replaced. This creates a feedback loop in which influence operations become increasingly responsive and effective.
The strategic danger lies not only in false information, but in the gradual erosion of trust. Repeated exposure to misleading narratives, manipulated content and emotionally charged claims can lead people to question official information, institutional credibility and even verifiable evidence. In such an environment, truth competes not only with falsehood, but also with confusion, cynicism and public fatigue.
Trust is therefore a strategic asset. During crises, governments depend on public confidence to ensure compliance, coordination and stability. When trust weakens, even accurate information may fail to gain acceptance. Uncertainty spreads, response efforts falter and social cohesion may erode. Decision-making becomes more contested, and policymakers may be pressured to act before facts are clear.
Small and middle powers are particularly exposed. Their vulnerability lies in the degree of disruption they can absorb, their exposure to external information flows, and the limits of their response capabilities. Smaller systems often have fewer resources to detect, analyse and counter sustained campaigns. Open societies and digital economies are especially exposed to external information shocks, while governments may face constraints in technical capability, communication capacity and institutional coordination.
This does not mean such states are defenceless. It means resilience must be built before crises emerge. The effectiveness of hostile campaigns depends not only on the perpetrator’s capability, but on the preparedness of the target society. States with strong public trust, clear communication structures and effective coordination are better positioned to withstand such pressures. Those that delay may find themselves reacting too late, with limited options to restore confidence.
Information resilience must therefore be approached as a whole-of-government and whole-of-society effort. It is not solely the responsibility of security agencies or communications teams. It involves government institutions, technology platforms, media organisations, educators, civil society and citizens. Each plays a role in shaping how information is verified, trusted and shared.
Several priorities stand out. First, strategic communication must be credible, timely and coordinated. Silence or inconsistency during crises creates space for speculation and manipulation. Governments require clear ownership of messaging, unity across agencies and the ability to communicate effectively with both domestic and external audiences. Credibility cannot be improvised during a crisis; it is built through sustained honesty and competence.
Second, public communication must be clear and aligned across government. Information threats span public and private systems. Digital platforms, media organisations and state agencies all shape the information environment. Clear rules, defined responsibilities and strong coordination mechanisms help address harmful manipulation without undermining public trust, human rights or the rule of law.
Third, technological safeguards are essential. States and societies need tools to detect manipulated content, identify coordinated behaviour and verify authenticity. This is increasingly critical as synthetic media becomes more convincing. However, technology alone is insufficient. Detection must be supported by effective communication, institutional processes and trusted channels for clarification.
Fourth, societal resilience is crucial. Citizens are active participants in the information environment. Public education should encourage critical thinking, discourage the spread of unverified content and strengthen media literacy. A well-informed population is more resistant to manipulation.
Importantly, information resilience is not about censorship or restricting public discourse. It is about strengthening awareness, critical thinking and institutional trust so that societies are less vulnerable to manipulation. These efforts must be balanced, safeguarding legitimacy and confidence while improving the capacity to respond to harmful narratives.
Artificial intelligence will continue to evolve, and its role in information competition will expand. The challenge is not to counter every false narrative, but to build societies capable of absorbing, questioning and recovering from information shocks. In the digital age, resilience extends beyond protecting systems and institutions. It includes safeguarding the cognitive space where trust, judgement and social cohesion reside.
For small and middle powers, the lesson is clear. Future crises may not begin with visible confrontation, but with contests over perception, manipulated content and the gradual erosion of confidence. Building information resilience early is therefore not optional. It is central to national resilience.
Colonel Sean Duffy Jonathan Galloway is an officer in the Singapore Armed Forces and is currently attending the National Resilience College at the National Centre for Defence Studies (PUSPAHANAS), Putrajaya.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent that of Twentytwo13.
