When global conversations turn to nuclear threats, Russia is almost always in the frame.
Western commentary often leans on a provocative idea: that Moscow subscribes to a doctrine of “escalate to de-escalate.” In simple terms, the theory suggests Russia would use limited nuclear strikes early in a conflict to frighten an adversary into backing down.
Many find this idea dramatic, and it has proved irresistible to news outlets and political commentators. It tells a story that is easy to repeat, but doing so risks overlooking the many layers of Russia’s strategy. The more we examine Russia’s military thinking, the more this narrative seems like an oversimplification and, in some ways, a misreading of the strategic logic at work in Moscow.
More recent studies suggest a different view. They indicate that Russia’s nuclear policy is driven more by practical assessments than outright aggression. The choices it makes are closely tied to how it judges the strength of its conventional forces compared with its nuclear arsenal.
When its conventional military is weak, nuclear threats rise. When conventional capabilities improve, reliance on nuclear options falls. This is the essence of the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis, a framework that better explains how Russia has shifted its doctrine over the past two decades and offers a clearer guide to assessing escalation risks in the future.
At the start of the 2000s, Russia’s regular armed forces were struggling. The long post-Soviet slump had drained resources, leaving much of the equipment outdated and many units poorly trained. Morale was low. Nato, meanwhile, was fielding modern precision-strike systems and operating under a highly coordinated command network. Faced with such an imbalance, Moscow shifted its military thinking.
The old Soviet promise never to use nuclear weapons first was quietly set aside. Instead, officials hinted that limited nuclear strikes might be considered if Russia were at risk of being overwhelmed by conventional force. This was intended less as a threat of reckless action than as a calculated signal to make any potential adversary think twice before pressing an advantage.
By around 2010, the picture was starting to change. Russia launched an ambitious programme to modernise its military, investing in new aircraft, missile systems, and units that could move quickly to hotspots. Weapons like the Iskander short-range ballistic missile gave commanders more reliable conventional choices in a crisis. These advances showed up in the official doctrine too. Nuclear arms were now described as an absolute last resort, to be used only if the state’s survival was in danger. It was a sign that Moscow felt more able to depend on conventional forces to safeguard its interests, while keeping nuclear weapons well out of immediate consideration.
From 2014 to 2020, Russia’s military operations reflected this new approach in action. Following the takeover of Crimea, its forces showed greater operational skill. Campaigns in eastern Ukraine and Syria revealed better coordination, improved logistics, and stronger integration of land, air, and cyber capabilities. These campaigns suggested that Moscow could achieve strategic objectives without relying on nuclear threats as the core of its strategy. While nuclear deterrence still existed in the background, it was no longer the first option in a crisis. The priority shifted toward using a wider mix of tools – conventional firepower, cyber measures, and information campaigns – to influence outcomes long before nuclear use was even on the table.
Even with these shifts, many Western analysts still describe Russia’s strategy as “escalate to de-escalate.” Part of the reason is that Moscow prefers to keep its intentions unclear. Official doctrine is worded so that it can be read in several ways, and senior Russian officials often mix reassuring statements with pointed warnings. It can be hard to tell when they are bluffing and when they are serious. Yet, looking at actual deployments, training exercises, and procurement plans tells a more grounded story. The pattern suggests a more balanced deterrence approach, where nuclear use is saved for the most extreme circumstances.
This reflects the main point of the Conventional Balance of Forces thesis: nuclear doctrine changes with shifts in conventional strength. As Russia’s regular forces have become stronger, its need to reach for nuclear options early in a conflict has dropped. That stands against the assumption of automatic nuclear escalation. It points instead to a view in Moscow that nuclear weapons are a fallback, a measure to be considered only if other tools fail or if the state is under direct, existential threat.
The risks are real. Believing that Russia is more willing to use nuclear weapons than it actually is can result in poor decisions. Leaders who expect any clash to trigger a nuclear strike might hesitate too much, or in some situations, overreact. Strengthening conventional forces, whether in Nato states or elsewhere, helps make deterrence stronger without relying so heavily on nuclear weapons. Arms control still matters, but it works best when matched with practical talks about how each side views its limits and threats. Cutting warheads is not enough; understanding how the other side thinks is just as important for avoiding conflict.
For Malaysia, far from the main US–Russia flashpoints, the takeaway still matters. Good strategy begins with a clear understanding of an opponent’s intentions and capabilities, rather than being shaped by fear or worst-case guesses. Military doctrines can and do change as the balance of power shifts. Recognising this can help smaller and medium-sized nations steer through today’s complex security environment, where an error in one part of the world can quickly ripple across others.
The stakes are rising as geopolitical tension returns to Europe and grows in the Asia-Pacific. The assumption that Russia will turn to nuclear weapons at the first sign of trouble is not just inaccurate – it is dangerous. The more accurate reading is that nuclear use is conditional, and the conditions are narrowing, not widening, as Russia’s conventional forces become more capable.
Of course, the threat has not vanished. Russia’s doctrine still allows for nuclear use in extreme scenarios, such as if Nato massed a large force along its borders or if its conventional forces were collapsing under pressure. This is very different from having a fixed plan to strike first. In nuclear strategy, how actions are perceived can be as important as actual capability. Misreading signals or misinterpreting intent could have disastrous results. That is why reducing uncertainty, strengthening conventional deterrence, and keeping communication channels open are all critical for preventing a crisis from spiralling into something far worse.
One of the most dangerous mistakes is to assume that nuclear conflict will happen no matter what. Leaders who think escalation cannot be avoided are far less likely to work at stopping it. Understanding the thinking behind Russia’s nuclear policy is not simply an academic topic; it is a practical necessity for keeping the global balance stable.
Lieutenant Colonel Azram Abdullah RMAF, is a member of the Royal Malaysian Air Force and is currently attending the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College (MAFDC), PUSPAHANAS, in Putrajaya.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of Twentytwo13.
