Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pas) is the largest single party in the Malaysian Parliament. At the 15th General Election in 2022, the party won 49 seats – its best-ever result, up from 18 in 2018 and above its previous peak of 27 in 1999.
It won all 14 parliamentary seats in Kelantan and eight in Terengganu. In the 2023 state elections, it won every seat in Terengganu and 43 of 45 in Kelantan, while Perikatan Nasional (PN) took 33 of 36 seats in Kedah.
Pas now governs or anchors four state governments – Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah and Perlis – and has held the PN chairmanship since February 2026.
For decades, Pas was dismissed as a rural east coast party. That view is now obsolete. Pas has moved from the margins of Malay politics to its centre. Seven factors explain why its position is structural rather than a passing wave.
1. Umno’s decline
For 60 years, Umno was the default home of Malay-Muslim voters, offering nationalism and patronage. The 1Malaysia Development Bhd (1MDB) scandal, its defeat in 2018 and factional strife damaged its standing.
At GE15, Umno won 26 seats and Barisan Nasional (BN) 30 – their worst-ever results. Voters who left Umno did not gravitate towards Pakatan Harapan (PH), which was seen as multiracial and dependent on non-Malay support. Instead, they turned to the party that credibly claimed to defend Malay-Muslim interests and had not changed its message. Pas did not need to reinvent itself – it only had to remain consistent while others shifted.
2. Media mastery
Pas mastered the new media ecosystem. The GE15 “green wave” was driven as much by short-form video as by ceramah. PN and Pas invested heavily in TikTok, Facebook Reels and WhatsApp, and analysts agree that PN out-engaged PH online, particularly among first-time voters.
Their content was simple, emotional and youth-oriented: clean governance versus rivals’ corruption, warnings about DAP’s influence, and a narrative of betrayal aimed at Umno supporters.
Pas has a natural advantage: its youth wing and religious-school network supply ustaz influencers and short Quranic reflections linked to current issues, while its leaders speak in an authentic Kelantanese idiom. PH, by contrast, relied on mainstream media and lengthy policy speeches.
3. Grassroots machine
Malay voters are increasingly concentrated in semi-urban towns such as Sungai Petani, Alor Setar, Kemaman and Tasek Gelugor, where people work in factories or the gig economy, face cost-of-living pressures and maintain strong religious and village ties.
Pas has branches in almost every Malay kampung and taman, sustained by member donations and mosque networks rather than government allocations. Umno’s branches weakened when state funding dried up; Pas’ did not, because they had never relied on it.
Kelantan, governed by Pas since 1990, and Terengganu serve as proof of concept. Critics point to lower GDP and water problems, but supporters highlight low crime, the absence of major corruption scandals involving the Menteri Besar and the preservation of Islamic identity. For voters anxious about rapid social change, stability and trustworthiness are persuasive.
4. Economic and moral alignment
Economic and moral anxieties reinforce each other. Polls show that the cost of living, rather than hudud, is the top concern among Malay voters, and the 2026 Merdeka Centre survey again found the economy dominating public sentiment.
Pas benefits by reframing economic hardship as a moral failing of the elite: living costs are high because of corruption and excess, while PN offers leaders who live simply. Tan Sri Abdul Hadi Awang and Datuk Seri Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man deliberately project modesty, contrasting with the luxury associated with the 1MDB trials.
Pas also links hardship to cultural change, presenting itself as the defender of moral order in debates over alcohol, LGBTQ+ visibility and vernacular schools. The 2022 PN manifesto rested on bread-and-butter pledges – including removing National Higher Education Fund Corporation (PTPTN) loan interest and raising civil-service allowances – while rallies emphasised Malay-Islamic unity. The policy is economic; the emotion is identity.
5. Opposition dominance
Pas is the senior partner and stable core of the opposition. In BN, it was a junior partner. In Pakatan Rakyat (2008–2015), it was constrained by DAP and PKR. In PN, the relationship is reversed.
Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin stepped down as PN chairman on Jan 1 following tensions between Bersatu and Pas over the Perlis leadership crisis.
On Feb 22, the PN Supreme Council unanimously appointed Terengganu Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar as chairman, following Hadi’s nomination.
Bersatu, weakened by defections and uncertainty over its leader’s legal position, now has less machinery and money than Pas. This allows Pas to claim the strongest Malay seats in any negotiation, while its policy preferences become coalition policy in PN-governed states with little serious resistance.
6. Tactical advantage
PH’s strategy handed Pas the initiative. After forming the Unity Government in 2022, PH sought Malay support by partnering with Umno.
In practice, PH unsettled its reformist base without winning over Umno’s supporters, and many Malay voters seeking change turned to Pas.
PH’s efforts to out-Islamise Pas risked legitimising the latter’s framework. When Islamic governance becomes the benchmark, voters may prefer the original to the copy.
The 2026 state elections show how far the balance has shifted. In Johor, BN won 48 of 56 seats in a contest in which Pas held back. Analysts attribute part of BN’s gains in Johor and Negeri Sembilan to Pas supporters who wanted to remove PH.
In Negeri Sembilan, under a BN-PN arrangement in which Pas ceded most seats to Umno, the alliance won a two-thirds majority: BN secured 18 seats, PN seven – four for Pas and three for Wawasan – while PH won just 11.
Anthony Loke and Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Aminuddin Harun both lost their seats.
7. Global context
Regional and global events have helped position Pas as a champion of Malay-Muslims. Anger over Palestinian suffering, the Rohingya crisis, Islamophobia and perceived double standards has strengthened ummah solidarity.
Pas positions itself as the conscience of Malay-Muslims on these issues. The perception of a rising “Israelisation” of politics, with governments seen as condoning the persecution of Muslims, has further enhanced its standing at home.
What this means for GE16
Pas enters GE16 with considerable strength: the largest bloc in Parliament, the PN chairmanship, control of the northern and eastern Malay heartland, a self-funded branch network, a reputation for modest and clean leadership, and a decisive voice in any alliance.
That position is likely to endure as long as Umno remains too weak to reclaim the Malay vote on its own, young Malays continue to face wage and housing pressures, and no rival offers an equally credible combination of a clean image, Malay-Muslim identity and grassroots organisation.
The question for GE16 is no longer whether Pas will be strong, but whether it will lead the Federal government or decide who does.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not represent those of Twentytwo13.
