As Malaysia moves steadily toward its 16th General Election (GE16), due by February 2028 at the latest, the country’s political landscape appears to be undergoing structural realignment.
While Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim’s Pakatan Harapan (PH)-led unity government retains formal control of Parliament and continues to poll competitively, deeper political currents suggest the next electoral contest may produce a markedly different outcome.
Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pas), founded in 1951 and the country’s most enduring Islamic political party, emerged from the 2022 general election (GE15) as the single largest party in Parliament. Its evolution from long-term opposition force to plausible federal governing party marks one of the most consequential developments in contemporary Malaysian politics.
This analysis argues that Pas is structurally, organisationally and strategically well-positioned to lead the next federal government, particularly if prevailing political trends persist.
Structural weakness of the PH unity government
Anwar’s administration was not born of a decisive electoral mandate. In GE15, PH secured only 82 parliamentary seats – far short of the 112 required for a simple majority.
The path to Putrajaya emerged through post-election bargaining and elite negotiations that culminated in the formation of a “unity government” incorporating Barisan Nasional (BN) and East Malaysian parties. While constitutionally legitimate, the arrangement reflected compromise rather than consolidated voter endorsement.
This foundational reality has shaped perceptions of legitimacy. The coalition is held together less by shared ideological coherence than by a collective determination to prevent Pas from assuming federal power. Such negative cohesion – unity against a common adversary – has inherent limits.
Over time, maintaining stability becomes increasingly dependent on transactional bargaining rather than policy consensus.
Governance challenges have further strained the administration. Rising living costs, persistent economic anxieties and policy recalibrations have contributed to public frustration.
Moreover, the government’s anti-corruption narrative has been complicated by controversial prosecutorial decisions and compromises involving political partners previously associated with integrity concerns.
For supporters who viewed Anwar as the embodiment of reformist politics, these developments have generated disappointment and scepticism.
Fragmentation within PH and its partners
Beyond performance questions, PH faces internal structural vulnerabilities. Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) remains heavily identified with Anwar himself. Succession uncertainties, factional undercurrents and limited leadership renewal raise concerns about the party’s long-term resilience.
A coalition overly dependent on one leader’s authority risks instability once that authority is diluted.
The Democratic Action Party (DAP), while electorally entrenched among urban and non-Malay voters, faces strategic constraints in Malay-majority constituencies. Tensions between coalition partners – occasionally visible in state-level contests – underscore the fragility of multiethnic coordination under competitive pressure.
Umno’s position within the unity government is even more precarious. Once the dominant pillar of Malaysian politics, Umno now struggles with identity erosion.
Its partnership with PH – historically its principal adversary – has unsettled segments of its traditional Malay nationalist base. For many grassroots members, cooperation with PH appears ideologically incongruent.
This disaffection creates political space for Pas to present itself as the more authentic defender of Malay-Muslim interests.
Smaller coalition actors, including Parti Amanah Negara, have struggled to broaden their appeal or effectively counter Pas within conservative Muslim constituencies. Collectively, these dynamics expose the unity government to both internal drift and electoral vulnerability.
Pas as the most cohesive and ascendant actor
In contrast to its rivals, Pas projects internal cohesion and ideological clarity. Emerging from GE15 with 49 parliamentary seats, it became the single largest party in the Dewan Rakyat.
This status provides symbolic capital – enabling Pas to claim momentum, visibility and leadership credentials in future coalition negotiations.
Crucially, Pas combines parliamentary presence with territorial governance experience. The party governs Kelantan and Terengganu – states where it has demonstrated remarkable electoral durability – as well as Kedah and Perlis.
While debates persist over development outcomes, Pas’ sustained control reflects organisational depth and voter loyalty. Its state-level administrations serve as platforms for cultivating bureaucratic experience and demonstrating governing competence.
Leadership depth further strengthens its position. Party president Tan Sri Abdul Hadi Awang provides ideological continuity and religious authority, while figures such as Tuan Ibrahim Tuan Man and Terengganu Menteri Besar Datuk Seri Ahmad Samsuri Mokhtar represent technocratic and generational evolution within the party.
Ahmad Samsuri, in particular, embodies a professionalised image that may broaden Pas’ appeal beyond its traditional base. His recent election as Perikatan Nasional chairman signals the rising national profile of Pas and its leadership, increasingly viewed as credible and comparatively inclusive.
At the grassroots level, Pas’ organisational infrastructure remains formidable. Its integration with religious networks – mosques, schools, welfare initiatives and community programmes – ensures sustained engagement between elections. This embedded presence contrasts with the more campaign-centric mobilisation models of other parties.
The arithmetic of Malay political consolidation
Malaysia’s demographic and electoral arithmetic favours parties capable of consolidating the Malay vote. With Umno weakened and Bersatu diminished, Pas now stands as the most organisationally robust Malay-majority party.
This reality exerts gravitational pressure across the broader Malay political landscape.
For Umno, continued alignment with PH risks further erosion of grassroots legitimacy. Strategic realignment toward Pas – whether before or after GE16 – could restore ideological coherence and voter consolidation. Bersatu, lacking sufficient strength to lead independently, may similarly find strategic subordination within a Pas-led coalition preferable to marginalisation.
The notion of a “Green Wave”, widely invoked after GE15, captures this momentum. Whether the wave continues unabated remains uncertain, but Pas has successfully positioned itself as the central pole of Malay-Muslim political identity.
Strategic moderation and national positioning
As opposition movements approach the prospect of federal power, strategic moderation often follows. Pas has exhibited signs of recalibration. While maintaining its Islamic orientation, it has broadened economic messaging, emphasised governance credentials and elevated leaders with technocratic profiles.
This evolution reflects recognition of Malaysia’s plural society. To govern federally, Pas must reassure non-Muslim minorities and East Malaysian partners. The prominence of relatively pragmatic leaders suggests awareness within the party that national viability requires rhetorical discipline and policy flexibility.
Malaysia’s political culture – where Islam has long been integrated into governance frameworks – may also soften resistance to Pas at the federal level, particularly if framed within constitutional continuity rather than radical rupture.
Constraints, obstacles and uncertainties
Despite favourable trends, obstacles remain significant. Non-Muslim apprehension toward Pas is deeply rooted. Electoral consolidation among Chinese and Indian voters against a Pas-led coalition could offset Malay gains in mixed constituencies.
Economic credibility represents another vulnerability. Governing individual states differs fundamentally from managing national macroeconomic policy amid global volatility. Pas would need to articulate convincing fiscal and developmental strategies to reassure investors and middle-class voters.
Internal diversity within Pas – between conservative clerical elements and pragmatic modernisers – could surface under the pressures of federal governance. Furthermore, Malaysia’s first-past-the-post electoral system introduces unpredictability, particularly in closely contested urban and semi-urban seats.
A plausible path to Putrajaya
Malaysia appears to be entering a new phase of political consolidation. The unity government’s structural compromises, combined with internal fragmentation and performance challenges, have created conditions conducive to realignment. Pas, through organisational discipline, electoral growth, state-level governance and strategic repositioning, has capitalised on these conditions.
Whether Pas ultimately forms the next federal government will depend on coalition arithmetic, leadership presentation and its ability to extend reassurance beyond its core base. Yet, barring a dramatic reversal of current trends, Pas stands as the most structurally advantaged political actor heading into GE16.
The decisive question is not inevitability, but execution: can Pas translate momentum into inclusive national leadership, and can its rivals reconstruct coherence before electoral deadlines converge?
As Malaysia approaches GE16, the contours of its next political era are becoming increasingly visible.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of Twentytwo13.
